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EMTALA's Stabilization Requirement Does Not
Require Proof of Improper Motive: Roberts v. Galen
of Virginia
HEALTH CARE LAW - EMERGENCY MEDICAL TREATMENT AND ACTIVE
LABOR ACT ("EMTALA") - RECOVERY OF DAMAGES UNDER EMTALA's

The Supreme Court of the United
States held that a plaintiff does not have to prove that a hospital
acted with an improper motive when seeking recovery for alleged
violations of EMTALAs stabilization requirement because the
language of the statute does not support such a test.
STABILIZATION

REQUIREMENT

-

Roberts v. Galen of Virginia, 119 S. Ct. 685 (1999).
A truck hit Wanda Johnson in May 1992 and severely injured
her.' Johnson was taken to the Humana Hospital-University of
Louisville ("Humana") in Louisville, Kentucky. 2 After six weeks in
that hospital, Humana transferred Johnson to Crestview Healthcare
Facility across the Ohio River in Indiana. 3 A Humana social worker
arranged Johnson's transfer and told a Crestview representative
that she had been pressured by Humana administrators to find
placement for Johnson due to her inability to pay her hospital
bills. 4 On the day Johnson arrived at Crestview, her condition
deteriorated and she had to be re-hospitalized in Indiana. 5 Johnson
stayed in the Indiana hospital several months, running up a sizeable
bill that she could not pay.6 Her application for financial assistance
from Medicaid was rejected because she failed to meet the
1. Roberts v. Galen of Va., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 685, 686 (1999). The accident resulted in
serious injuries to Johnson's pelvis, right leg, spine and brain. Id. She was hit as she was
walking home from her job as a cashier at Hardee's Restaurant. Brief of Petitioner at 2,
Roberts v. Galen of Va Inc., 119 S. Ct. 685 (1999) (No. 97-53).
2. Roberts, 119 S. Ct. at 686.
3. Id.
4. Roberts v. Galen of Va., 111 F.3d 405, 411 (6th Cir. 1997), rev'd, 119 S. Ct. 685 (1999).
5. Roberts, 119 S. Ct. at 686. At the time Johnson was transferred, she was receiving
medication for a recently discovered urinary tract infection. Roberts, 111 F.3d at 410. The
doctors overseeing Johnson's care at Humana did not evaluate the effectiveness of this
course of treatment before transferring .Johnson to Crestview. Id. Complications related to
this infection caused her subsequent hospitalization in Indiana. Id.
6. Roberts, 119 S. Ct. at 686. Johnson's bill totaled $388,679.93. Roberts, 111 F3d at 407.
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residency requirements of the Indiana Medicaid program.'
Jane Roberts, Wanda Johnson's guardian,8 sued Humana in
federal district court alleging that Johnson had been sent to the
nursing home in an unstable condition in violation of the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act ("EMTALA7). 9
EMTALA imposes on hospitals with emergency rooms both a
screening duty' ° and a stabilization duty" when individuals seek
treatment at the emergency room for emergency medical
conditions 12 or active labor and creates a private cause of action in
13
cases where either of these requirements is violated.
7. Roberts, 119 S. Ct. at 686.
8. Id. Jane Roberts was Johnson's aunt. Roberts, 111 E3d at 406. Wanda Johnson's
husband was only minimally involved in her care because he had abandoned Johnson and
their five-year-old son and was living with another woman. Brief of Petitioner at 4, Roberts v.
Galen of Va. Inc., 119 S. Ct. 685 (1999) (No. 97-53). Johnson's elderly mother was too infirm
to take on the responsibility of her health care. Id.
9. EMTALA is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1994). Federal district courts are
empowered to hear EMTALA cases due to their subject matter jurisdiction over cases
involving federal statutes. Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hosp., 895 F2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1990).
10. Roberts, 119 S. Ct. at 685. EMTALA's screening requirement is as follows:
In the case of a hospital that has a hospital emergency department, if any
individual . . . comes to the emergency department and a request is made on the
individual's behalf for examination or treatment for a medical condition, the hospital
must provide for an appropriate medical screening examination within the capability
of the hospital's emergency department, including ancillary services routinely available
to the emergency department, to determine whether an emergency medical
condition . . . exists.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1994).
11. Roberts, 119 S. Ct. at 685. EMTALA's stabilization requirement is as follows:
If any individual . . . comes to a hospital and the hospital determines that the
individual has an emergency medical condition, the hospital must provide either within the staff and facilities available at the hospital, for such further medical
examination and such treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical condition,
or for transfer of the individual to another medical facility in accordance with
subsection (e) of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (1994).
12. An "emergency medical condition" under EMTALA is a medical condition that
places a patient at imminent risk of serious disability or death. Thornton v. Southwest
Detroit Hosp., 895 F2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1990). The statute defines the term in the following
manner.
The term "emergency medical condition" means a medical condition manifesting itself
by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that the absence
of immediate medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in: (i) placing
the health of the individual in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment to bodily
functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of a bodily organ or part.
42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(e)(1) (1994).
13. Roberts, 119 S. Ct. at 686. A private cause of action in EMTALA cases was created
by 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(d)(2)(a) (1994) (stating that "any individual who suffers personal harm
as a direct result of a participating hospital's violation of a requirement in this section may,
in a civil action against the participating hospital obtain... damages").
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The United States District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky granted Humana's motion for summary judgment 14 on the
basis that neither Humana's opinion that Johnson was stable 15 nor
Humana's decision to transfer 6 her to Crestview was due to an
improper motive. 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the ruling of the district court, holding that recovery of damages
under EMTALA for a hospital's failure to stabilize an individual's
condition required proof of an improper motive, such as a showing
that the individual was treated differently because of gender, race,
or poverty. 8 In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit extended
an earlier precedent that held that plaintiffs seeking recovery under
EMTALA for a hospital's failure to screen an individual for an
emergency medical condition must prove an improper motive.' 9 The
14. Roberts, 119 S. Ct. at 686. "Summary judgment" is a "procedural device available for
a prompt and expeditious disposition of a controversy without trial when there is no dispute
as to either material fact or inferences to be drawn from undisputed fact, or if only a
question of law is involved." BLAcK's LAW DICIONARY 1435 (6th ed. 1990).
15. Roberts, 119 S. Ct. at 686. Under EMTALA the term "stabilized" means that "no
material deterioration of the condition is likely, within reasonable medical probability, to
result from or occur during the transfer of the individual from a facility ...
" 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd(e)(3)(b) (1994).
16. Roberts, 119 S. Ct. at 686. EMTALA permits the transfer of unstabilized patients
experiencing emergency medical conditions if the requirements for an "appropriate transfer"
are met. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(c)(2) (1994). The hospital must document the fact that it sent all
medical records with the patient to a facility that was able to treat the patient, and that it
provided appropriate treatment during transfer. Id. Humana contended that it had stabilized
Johnson's condition, so this provision was not at issue in Roberts. Roberts, 111 F.3d at 410.
17. Roberts, 119 S. Ct. at 686. The district court initially refused to grant sununary
judgment, ruling that there were genuine issues of material fact concerning whether
Johnson's condition was stable when she was transferred from Humana to the nursing home
and whether Humana acted with an improper motive. Roberts, 111 F3d. at 407. On
reconsideration, the district court granted Humana's request for summary judgment because,
despite the existence of some genuine issues of material fact, Johnson had failed to prove
that either the opinion that she was stable or the decision to allow her to be transferred was
caused by an improper motive. Id. The district court also granted summary judgment on a
state law negligence claim on the grounds that the medical residents involved in Johnson's
care were not ostensible agents of the hospital. Id.
18. Roberts, 111 F.3d at 409. In its opinion, the circuit court of appeals noted a number
of factors that could lead to a patient receiving substandard treatment, including ethnicity,
race, gender, personal dislike, dislike of the patient's occupation, as well as political and
cultural factors. Id. (citing Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc. 917 F2d 266 (6th Cir.
1990)). A Humana social worker knew of Johnson's poverty and told a Crestview
representative that she had been pressured by Humana administrators to place Johnson
elsewhere. Roberts, 111 E3d at 411. However, the three physicians involved in Johnson's care
stated in affidavits that they were unaware of her indigence and that it did not play a role in
their medical opinion that she was stable or in their subsequent decision to transfer her. Id.
19. Roberts, 119 S. Ct. at 686. The Sixth Circuit established this rule with regard to 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) in Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 E2d 266 (6th Cir.
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court was concerned that a more expansive interpretation of the
statute could federalize state malpractice law or at the most
extreme be viewed as guaranteeing successful medical results to
patients. 0
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 2 to consider
the narrow issue of whether a plaintiff must prove an improper
motive on the part of a hospital to recover for the hospital's failure
to stabilize an individual's emergency medical condition under
EMTALNs stabilization requirement.22 In a per curiam opinion,?' the
Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's holding and remanded the case
for further proceedings.2 4 The Supreme Court found no basis in the
text of the statute for an improper motive test in cases brought
under EMTALA's stabilization requirement. 25 The Court noted that
unlike the EMTALA duty to provide "appropriate screening" the
statute did not use the word "appropriate" in connection with the
stabilization requirement. 26 Without an express appropriateness
requirement, the Court found there was no statutory basis for
requiring an EMTALA plaintiff to prove an improper motive with
regard to the hospital's failure to perform its duty to stabilize a
patient's condition before discharge or transfer.27
The Court quoted from a section in Humana's brief in which
Humana admitted that the traditional rules of statutory
construction did not support the Sixth Circuit's approach of reading
a motive test into EMTALA's stabilization requirement.2 8 While this
concession was not dispositive of the legal issue, the Court viewed
1990).
20. Roberts, 119 S.Ct. at 686.
21. Roberts v. Galen of Va., 118 S.Ct. 2295 (1998). Certiorari is
[a] writ of common law origin issued by a superior to an inferior court requiring the
latter to produce a certified record of a particular case tried therein.... [The term is]
[m]ost commonly used to refer to the Supreme Court of the United States, which uses
the writ of certiorari as a discretionary device to choose the cases it wishes to hear.
BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 228 (6th ed. 1990).
22. Roberts, 119 S. Ct. at 686. The Court did not consider the state law negligence
claim. Id.
23. "Per curiam" is defined as "a phrase used to distinguish an opinion of the whole
court from an opinion written by any one judge." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1136 (6th ed. 1990).
24. Roberts, 119 S. Ct. at 687. To be determined on remand are the issues of whether
the hospital's duty under EMTALA ended when it allegedly properly screened Johnson,
whether it had in fact properly screened her, whether the hospital had actual knowledge of
Johnson's condition, and whether these issues would be legally dispositive. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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it as further support for its own conclusion.2 9 The Court did not
rule on the correctness of the Sixth Circuit's requirement of proof
of an improper motive in relation to EMTALAs screening
requirement, but it did note that in interpreting EMTALA to
mandate such a test the Sixth Circuit is in conflict with several
other circuits that do not interpret EMTALA to require an improper
motive in cases involving appropriate screening. 30
The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act was
enacted to provide a remedy not traditionally available under state
tort law.31 While the common law imposes a duty of care on
hospitals and physicians with respect to patients already under
their care, it does not give individuals a cause of action for a
hospital's failure to accept and treat them in the first place. 32 Under
the common law, hospitals are free to refuse to treat individuals
seeking emergency medical treatment.m At the time EMTALA was
debated in Congress, only twenty-two states had laws mandating
emergency health care, and these laws varied greatly in scope. 4 At
the federal level, the Hill-Burton Act 35 requires that hospitals
receiving funds under the Act provide emergency services to
individuals living in the hospitals' service areas, even if those
individuals are unable to pay for the services. 36 Congress apparently
believed the Hill-Burton Act and attempts to enforce it were
insufficient to deal with the problem of "patient dumping" that
37
EMTALA was enacted to address.
29. Roberts, 119 S. Ct. at 687.
30. Id. The Supreme Court cited five circuits that do not interpret EMTALA to require
an improper motive in cases involving the appropriate screening requirement. Id. (citing
Summers v. Baptist Med. Ctr. Arkadelphia, 91 F3d 1132, 1137-38 (8th Cir. 1996) (en banc);
Correa v. Hospital San Francisco, 69 F.3d 1184, 1193-94 (1st Cir. 1995); Repp v. Anadarko
Mun. Hosp., 43 E3d 519, 522 (10th Cir. 1994); Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass'n, 42 F3d 851,
857 (4th Cir. 1994); and Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F2d 1037, 1041 (D.C.
Cir. 1991)).
31. Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041.
32. Brooks v. Maryland, 996 E2d 708, 710 (4th Cir. 1993).
33. Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041. Under the common law, no one has a duty to render
assistance to an individual unless a relationship exists between the two which gives rise to a
duty to act, so "a physician is under no duty to answer the call of one who is dying and
might be saved, nor is anyone required to . .. bind up the wounds of a stranger." W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56 at

375 (5th ed. 1984).

34. H.R. REP. No. 99-241, pt. 3 at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 726, 726-27. These
laws varied from broad protections like those later granted by EMTAIA to more narrow
provisions prohibiting refusal to treat only on the basis of indigence or lack of insurance.
Karen Treiger, Note, Sharpening the Cobra's Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L REV. 1186 (1986).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1994).
36. Id.
37. Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group, Inc., 917 F.2d at 268 (6th Cir. 1990). Patient
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At the time EMTALA became law in 1986, Congress was
concerned that an increasing number of hospitals were refusing to
treat patients who came to the emergency room without
insuranceY8 To curtail this practice, Congress imposed new duties
on nearly all hospitals in the United States, requiring all hospitals
receiving payments through the Medicare program to comply with
39
EMTALA.
Despite its legislative history indicating a focus on the narrow
concern of ensuring emergency room treatment for the poor and
uninsured, the actual language used by Congress extended
EMTALXs protections to "all persons" without regard to indigence
or lack of insurance. 40 The law mandates both an appropriate
medical screening for "any individual" who comes to the emergency
room of a covered hospital4 as well as stabilization of the
condition of any such individual who is discovered to have an
emergency medical condition. 42 Courts faced with EMTALA cases
have grappled with the disparity between the plain meaning of the
statutory language and Congress' intent to end the dumping of poor
patients. 3 Courts found guidance in the principle that the statute
was not written to federalize state malpractice law or to guarantee
positive results for patients.44
In early EMTALA cases, some district courts reached the
conclusion that EMTALA only protected poor or uninsured
patients. 45 For example, in 1989 the district court in Evitt v.
University Heights Hospital46 relied on the legislative history
rather than the statute's plain meaning, emphasizing the
congressional intent to prevent the dumping or turning away of the
poor and uninsured. 47 The court limited recovery under EMTALA to
dumping is the practice of discharging or transferring to other facilities patients who are not
able to pay for treatment. Gatewood, 933 F3d at 1039.
38. Correa v. Hospital of San Francisco, 69 F3d at 1189 (1st Cir. 1995).
39. Id. at 1189-90. The First Circuit stated that "ninety-nine percent of all American
hospitals" were covered by EMTALA. Id. at 1191.
40. Id. at 1189-90.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a) (1994).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(b) (1994).
43. Cleland, 917 E2d 270.
44.

Id.

45. See Stewart v. Myrick, 731 F Supp 433 (D. Kan. 1990); Evitt v. University Heights
Hosp., 727 F Supp. 495 (S.D. Ind. 1989); Nichols v. Estabrook, 741 F. Supp. 325 (D.N.H.
1989).
46. 727 F Supp. 495 (S.D. Ind. 1989).
47. Evitt, 727 F. Supp. at 497. The plaintiff was a patient who had experienced chest
pains and was misdiagnosed in an examiniation which did not include an electrocardiogram.
Id. at 496. After she returned to the hospital she was properly diagnosed as having suffered
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cases where plaintiffs could prove that the hospital acted with an
economic motive. 48 The court reasoned that allowing plaintiffs to
recover without such proof would lead to the preemption of state
medical malpractice law, a result not intended by Congress. 49 In the
court's view, legal issues relating to treatment and diagnosis
50
belonged to state medical malpractice law, not EMTALA.
The belief that EMTALA was limited to protecting the poor and
51
uninsured was rejected by a district court in DeBerry v. Sherman.
The judge gave two reasons for departing from the analysis in Evitt
and following the plain meaning of the text of EMTALA rather than
the more limited construction suggested by its legislative history.52
First, the DeBerry court noted that the Evitt court had not even
referred to an analysis of the actual words of the statute in
reaching its narrow construction.5 The DeBerry court conceded
that the legislative history showed Congress' primary intent in
passing the act was to protect the indigent, but went on to point
out that the language of the law went far beyond that limited goal,
never mentioning the patient's ability to pay or the hospital's
motive.5 Second, the court did not agree that the statute had to be
narrowly interpreted because of its potential for preemption of
state law.55 The DeBerry court noted that EMTALA might prohibit
conduct also prohibited by state law but would not preempt the
state law unless a direct conflict existed between EMTALA and the
state law.5 6 Under this analysis, EMTALA causes only a limited
conflict preemption rather than the more expansive field
preemption that the Evitt court assumed would result from a
57
broader interpretation.

a heart attack. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 498.
51. DeBerry v. Sherman Hosp. Ass'n, 741 F Supp. 1302 (N.D. Ill. 1990). The plaintiff
took her daughter to the hospital's emergency room with symptoms that included a fever,
rash, stiff neck, and lethargy. Id. at 1030. The patient was discharged two days later with an
undetected case of spinal meningitis and became deaf as a result. Id.
52. DeBerry, 741 F Supp. at 1306-07.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1306.
55. Id. at 1307.
56. Id. at 1307. The court also noted that plaintiffs were not prevented from bringing
both types of claims. Id.
57. DeBerry, 741 F Supp. at 1307. The court referred to the following language from 42
U.S.C. § 1395dd(f) of EMTALA. "The provisions of this section do not preempt any state or
local law requirement, except to the extent that the requirement directly conflicts with a
requirement of this section." Id.
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The Sixth Circuit was the first federal circuit court of appeals to
wrestle with EMTALA. In Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hospitals
the Sixth Circuit expressed the view in dicta that EMTALA only
applied to poor or uninsured patients. 59 After stating that EMTALA
required hospitals to treat indigent patients with emergency
medical conditions or in active labor, the court referred to the
goals of Congress in passing the Act.60 Circuit Judge Boyce F
Martin, Jr. distinguished EMTALA from state medical malpractice
law, noting that while EMTAIA imposed liability for refusal to treat
a potential patient, state malpractice law usually did not.61 Though
the Sixth Circuit upheld the lower court's grant of summary
judgment to the hospital, it rejected the defendant's argument that
EMTALA coverage stopped once the patient left the emergency
room.62 The Thornton court took a broad view of the statute and
held that it protected patients with known emergency medical
conditions from discharge or inappropriate transfer until
stabilization, regardless of whether they remained in the emergency
room.6
Shortly after its decision in Thornton, the Sixth Circuit returned
to the EMTALA arena in Cleland v. Bronson Health Care Group.64
Though it ultimately upheld the district court's grant of summary
judgment on other grounds, the circuit court rejected the lower
court's ruling that EMTALA applied only to poor patients and held
that the act applied to all patients. 65 The court relied on the
58. 895 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1990).
59. Id. at 1132. The court stated that "the Act requires hospitals to give emergency aid
to indigent patients who suffer from an 'emergency medical condition' or 'active labor.'" Id.
The Sixth Circuit later classified this statement as dicta because the patient in Thornton had
insurance and repudiated the view that EMTALA is limited to protecting the poor. Cleland,
917 F.2d at 266.
60. Thornton, 895 F2d at 1132. The plaintiff suffered a stroke and was discharged from
the hospital to her sister's home after a rehabilitation facility refused to accept her due to
insurance reasons. Id. Her condition deteriorated until she was finally admitted to the
rehabilitation facility nearly three months later. Id.
61. Id. at 1133.
62. Id. at 1135.
63. Id. Summary judgment for the hospital was upheld on the basis that the plaintiff's
initial emergency medical condition had been stabilized at the time of her release. Id.
64. 917 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1990). Cleland was the precedent the circuit would build
upon in Roberts v. Galen of Virginia. Roberts, 119 S. Ct. at 686. The plaintiffs' teenage son
died of cardiac arrest that resulted from a severe intestinal problem, intussusception.
Cleland, 917 F.2d at 268. The hospital had improperly diagnosed his severe cramps and
vomiting as symptoms of influenza and discharged him. Id.
65. Cleland, 917 F.2d at 270.
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66
statute's plain meaning to reach its result.

The Cleland court limited EMTALA recovery in two ways: (1)
limiting a hospital's liability under the stabilization requirement to
emergency medical conditions within the actual knowledge of the
treating physician, 67 and (2) establishing the improper motive test
for recovery under the statute.68 This test arose after Circuit Judge
Boggs found the word "appropriate" as used in the appropriate
medical screening requirement to be ambiguous and interpreted the
word to mean uniform, reading it as a reference to the motives of
the hospital. 69 Under this approach, each patient must receive the

same type of screening that any other patient would receive
without discrimination.7 0 Both the medical screening and the
stabilization treatment in that case were "appropriate" under that
definition because the patient had received the same type of
treatment any other patient would have received regardless of
personal characteristics.71
The plaintiffs' argument was characterized as interpreting
"appropriate" to incorporate standards of care from state medical
malpractice law, or even to guarantee a successful result. 72
Referring to statutory language mandating screening within the
capabilities of the hospital, the court concluded that the EMTALA
standard of care was not a malpractice standard. 73 The key
question under the medical screening requirement, the court
explained, is not whether medically appropriate steps were taken,
but rather whether the patient was treated less favorably than
other similarly situated patients would have been treated. 74 The
court went on to list possible improper motives that could cause a
hospital to be liable under the screening requirement of EMTALA,
including discrimination based on gender, race, political affiliation,
occupation, personal dislike, lack of sobriety, and other
66. Id.
67. Id. at 268-69. The court cited dicta from Thornton in support of this conclusion. Id.
at 271 (citing Thornton, 895 F2d at 1134).
68. Cleland, 917 F2d at 271.
69. Id. The judge stated, "Appropriate is one of the most wonderful weasel words in
the dictionary and a great aid to the resolution of disputed issues in drafting legislation.
Who, after all, can be found to stand up for 'inappropriate' treatment or actions of any sort?"
Id.
70. Id. at 271-72.
71. Id. at 271.
72. Id.
73. Cleland, 917 F2d at 272.
74. Id.
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non-medical factors.7 5
Although five other circuit courts would later join the Sixth
Circuit in interpreting EMTALA to apply to all patients (as opposed
to only poor or uninsured patients), these five circuits unanimously
rejected an interpretation of the word "appropriate" that required
patients to prove an improper motive in order to recover under
EMTALAs screening requirement.
In Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp.,7 6 the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia decided whether
recovery for violation of EMTALAs screening requirement required
a plaintiff to prove an improper motive.77 The court cited Cleland in
reaching the conclusion that EMTALA is not limited to protecting
only uninsured patients.7 8 Circuit Judge Harry Edwards also
rejected the plaintiffs argument that an EMTALA violation occurs
any time a covered hospital misdiagnoses a patient, holding that
EMTALA was not meant to create a federal cause of action for
malpractice or guarantee an accurate diagnosis, but rather to
guarantee that patients in similar circumstances are treated the
same. 79 A circuit split arose when the District of Columbia Circuit
departed from the Sixth Circuit's limitation of liability under
EMTALA to cases where it could be proved that the hospital acted
with an improper motive.8°
According to Gatewood, a hospital breaches its duty under
EMTALA to perform appropriate medical screening when it fails to
provide the standard screening procedures it customarily gives to
patients in the same condition; the motive for this failure, if any, is
unimportant. 81 The fact that a hospital's standard screening could
75. Id. The court's list included "without limitation, race, sex, politics, occupation,
education, personal prejudice, drunkenness, spite, etc." Id.
76. 933 F2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
77. Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1037, 1041. This was the second EMTALA case to be decided
by a federal circuit court of appeals and was brought by Alice Gatewood, widow of William
Gatewood. Id. Mr. Gatewood died of a heart attack the day after he was misdiagnosed at an
emergency room as having non-serious musculoskeletal pain and discharged with
instructions to take a pain reliever and use a heating pad. Id. at 1038-39.
78. Id. at 1040. The D.C. Circuit disagreed with the reasoning of the district court,
which had granted summary judgment to the hospital on the grounds that Mr. Gatewood was
not covered by EMTALA because he had medical insurance, but affirmed the result on other
grounds. Id. at 1038, 1041.
79. Id. at 1039-41.
80. Id. at 1041.
81. Id. Despite this favorable ruling for the plaintiff, the court upheld the district
court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant on the grounds that William Gatewood
had received the same type of screening ordinarily given by the hospital to patients in the
same condition. Id.
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be so inadequate as to constitute malpractice under state law was
noted; however, the court declined to incorporate malpractice
standards into EMTALA. s2 The court reasoned that EMTALA was
not intended to duplicate protections under state law but to
provide a new remedy, leaving most issues related to the medical
adequacy of treatment to local negligence law.83 The Gatewood
Court did not address the plaintiff's claims under EMTALAs
stabilization requirement because the patient was never diagnosed
with an emergency condition.84
The Fourth Circuit sided with the District of Columbia Circuit in
Power v. Arlington Hospital Ass'n s5 by ruling that recovery under
EMTALXs screening requirement does not require proof of an
improper motive, citing three reasons for this conclusion.86 First, its
examination of the statute failed to find any statutory reference to
a consideration of the hospital's motive for failing to screen a
patient. 7 Second, the Fourth Circuit suggested that the wide range
of motives discussed in Cleland was so broad that the motive test
was not an objective test but rather an invitation for an EMTALA
plaintiff to invent some imaginable motive for substandard
treatment on which to base a claim.88 Finally, despite the expected
ease of finding some plausible improper motive on which to
advance an EMTALA case, winning the case would be almost
impossible if plaintiffs had to prove the existence of the alleged
motive in the minds of the hospital's agents.8 9 Recovery on an
EMTALA claim for failure to screen under Power, as under
Gatewood, requires patients to prove they were treated differently
82. Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 42 F3d 851 (4th Cir. 1994).
86. Power, 42 F3d at 857-58.
87. Id. at 857.
88. Id. at 857-58. The court stated, "The expanse of motives suggested by the Sixth
Circuit is so broad to be no limit at all, and as a practical matter amounts to not having a
motive requirement Anyone . . . can simply find a motive that fits whether it is sex,
nationality, income or occupation and... allege it." Id. at 857.
89. Id. at 858. In addition to being the second case from a federal circuit court of
appeals rejecting the Cleland motive requirement, Power is also notable for its ruling that a
state law cap on malpractice damages limited a plaintiff's recovery under EMTALA. Id. at
864. The case also outlines a burden shifting procedure for EMTALA cases, first requiring
plaintiffs to make a "threshold showing of differential treatment." Id. at 858. The hospital
may then. rebut the prima facie case or present evidence that the disparity occurred because
of a decision based on the medical judgment of the treating physicians. Id. Finally, the
plaintiff may challenge the defendant's evidence and use expert testimony to challenge the
medical judgment of the treating physicians. Id.
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than other similarly situated patients without having to prove any
motive for the disparity.90
Both the Tenth Circuit and the First Circuit cited Gatewood when
refusing to read the motive test into EMTAL! s appropriate
screening requirement in Repp v. Anadarko9l and Correa v.
Hospital San Francisco.2 In Repp, the Tenth Circuit also declined
to adopt an approach advocated by the plaintiff who believed the
court should have given a substantive content to the medical
screening requirement. 93 The Repp court ruled that EMTAL/ s
screening requirement was violated when a hospital failed to
uniformly perform its own standard procedures, not by
misdiagnosis, and that an "appropriate" screening could vary from
emergency room to emergency room. 9 4 In a footnote, the Tenth
Circuit noted the different approach employed by the Sixth Circuit
in interpreting "appropriate" to refer to motives. 95 The First Circuit
in Correa also criticized the Sixth Circuit's improper motive
requirement in a footnote, echoing the reasoning in Power.9
In Summers v. Baptist Medical Center,97 the Eighth Circuit,
sitting en banc, 98 considered the issue of the proper construction of
EMTALAs screening requirement, and continued the trend of
following Gatewood by rejecting the motive test outlined by the
Sixth Circuit in Cleland.99 Writing for the court, Chief Judge
90. Id. at 857.
91. 43 F3d 519 (10th Cir. 1994).
92. 69 F.3d 1184 (lst Cir. 1994). The plaintiffs in Correa were relatives of Carmen
Gonzales, a 65 year old woman who died of a heart attack after waiting for treatment in an
emergency room for over two hours before leaving to seek treatment elsewhere. Id. at
1188-89. The delay was determined to be the equivalent of a denial of a screening
examination, a type of "constructive dumping." Id. at 1193. The plaintiffs won at trial and the
First Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1198.
93. Repp, 43 F3d at 522. At trial this case involved alleged violations of both the
medical screening and stabilization requirements of EMTALA. Id. After summary judgment,
the plaintiff appealed only the screening issue. Id. The plaintiffs husband died of cardiac
arrest a few hours after his misdiagnosis and discharge from an emergency room. Id. at 521.
94. Id. at 522. Summary judgment was upheld because any variations from standard
screening procedures in the case were deemed by the court to be minimal. Id. at 523.
95. Id. at 522-23 n.6.
96. Correa, 69 F3d at 1194 n.9.
97. 91 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 1996).
98. "En banc" means "[i]n the bench" or "[flull bench" and "[riefers to a session where
the entire membership of the court will participate in the decision rather than the regular
quorum." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 526 (6th ed. 1990).

99. Summers v. Baptist Med. Ctr. Arkadelphia, 91 F3d at 1138 (8th Cir. 1996). The
plaintiff fell out of a tree while he was hunting deer. Id. at 1135. A physician examined the
plaintiff and took x-rays of his spine but did not x-ray his chest, thereby missing a broken
rib and sternum, as well as a fractured vertebrae. Id. The patient asked to be admitted to the
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Richard S. Arnold considered possible meanings of the
"appropriate" screening mandated by EMTALA.' °° Judge Arnold
followed previous cases, including Cleland, in ruling that an
appropriate screening was one free of any disparities, such as those
caused by prejudice against the patient for the reasons outlined in
Cleland.0 1 The court held, however, that the plaintiff did not have
to prove an improper motive underlying the difference, just the
10 2
absence of uniform treatment without a medical justification.
The Summers court rejected what it described as possibly the
most natural interpretation of EMTALAs appropriate screening
requirement, viewing the word "appropriate" to mean that the
screening was properly performed in a non-negligent manner. 03 In
rejecting this interpretation, the court noted that no other court
had read EMTALA in such an "expansive fashion"0 4 and relied
heavily on the legislative history and text of the statute, which did
not evidence a congressional intent to cause a large scale
preemption of state medical malpractice law. 05 The chief judge
believed this conservative approach to EMTALA taken by previous
courts was based on concerns related to the principles of
federalism.10 6 While Congress may preempt state law in areas in
which it has constitutional authority, courts will not construe a
07
statute to do so unless Congress clearly expresses this intent.
Although EMTALA imposes limited duties on hospitals receiving
individuals in emergency rooms, it is not a federal malpractice
statute.'08 In the view of the Eighth Circuit, a motive test was not
necessary to maintain the proper limits on the reach of EMTALA
nor was it justified in the text of the statute.' °9
Like Cleland and Gatewood, cases such as Repp, Correa and
hospital but was discharged and had to drive himself, in great pain, to his home five hours
away. Id.
100. Id. at 1136.
101. Id. at 1138.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1136.
104. Summers, 91 F3d at 1136.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1137. Federalism is defined as a "[t]erm which includes interrelationships
among the states and relationship between the states and the federal government." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 612 (6th ed. 1990).
107. Summers, 91 F3d at 1137.
108. Id. The court stated, "EMTALA is not intended to duplicate preexisting legal
protections, but rather to create a new cause of action, generally unavailable under state tort
law, for what amounts to failure to treat." Id. at 1137 (quoting Gatewood, 933 F.2d at 1041).
109. Summers, 91 F.3d at 1138.
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Summers dealt with the question of whether EMTALAs appropriate
screening requirement contains an improper motive test. 110 In
Roberts v. Galen, the Sixth Circuit extended its motive test from
the screening requirement to another part of EMTALA, the
stabilization requirement.' In Burditt v. U.S. Department of Health
and Human Service,"' the Fifth Circuit also considered the issue
of whether an improper motive must be proved as a prerequisite
for recovery of damages under the EMTALA stabilization
requirement. 13 The court interpreted EMTALA as it was written and
ignored the legislative history. 1 4 Like the other circuits that
considered the issue of an improper motive test in EMTALAs
screening requirement after the Sixth Circuit," 5 the court rejected
the improper motive test for recovery under EMTALA, finding no
6
such requirement in the statute."
Two district court decisions illustrate the difficulty of recovery
under EMTALA in cases where courts use the improper motive test
the Sixth Circuit established in Cleland. In Hines v. Adair County
Public Hospital District,"7 the court allowed six months solely for
discovery of evidence of an improper motive in a case involving an
alleged violation of both the screening and stabilization
requirements of EMTALA. "l 8 The plaintiff, whose leg was amputated
because of complications resulting from a misdiagnosis, was unable
to present sufficient evidence to overcome the hospital's motion for
summary judgment despite the court's assumption that the patient
was discharged with a known emergency medical condition in a
manner that would violate EMTALA if an improper motive could be
proved." 9 Summary judgment was granted even though the court
110. Roberts, 119 S. Ct. at 687.
111. Id.
112. 934 E2d 1362 (5th Cir. 1991). In this case a woman experiencing active labor and
extreme hypertension was sent to another hospital nearly two hundred miles away in
violation of the stabilization and transfer requirements of EMTALA. Id. at 1366-67. The
plaintiff prevailed before an executive appeals board of the Department of Health and
Human Services and the circuit court affirmed. Id. at 1366.
113. Id. Burditt involved alleged violations of the Act's stabilization and transfer
requirements. Id. at 1368, 1370.
114. Id. at 1373.
115. Roberts, 119 S. Ct. at 686.
116. Burditt, 934 F2d at 1373. Though the court referred specifically to the alleged
violation of EMTALA/s transfer requirement in its discussion of the motive test, it allowed the
plaintiff to recover on both the transfer and stabilization claims without proof of an
improper motive. Id. at 1376.
117. 827 F Supp. 426 (W.D. Ky. 1993).
118. Hines, 827 F Supp. at 430.
119. Id. at 433.
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took a broad view of the motive requirement, stating that even
arbitrary reasons, such as the decision not to screen or stabilize a
patient because it was the end of a shift, could serve as an
improper motive sufficient to advance a successful EMTALA
20
claim.
Likewise, in Adams v. Grace Hospital,121 the district court relied
on Cleland in awarding summary judgment to a hospital when the
plaintiff failed to present evidence of an improper motive for an
alleged violation of EMTAL~s medical screening requirement. 2 2 In
Adams, the hospital sent a patient without insurance home in a
taxi without treatment, allegedly with a note pinned to his shirt
stating "if lost, send him home."'13 Mr. Adams had to crawl into his
house due to his weakened condition.124 He returned to the
emergency room the next day where he was properly diagnosed as
having an acute case of urosepsis and admitted. 125 Adams died two
weeks later.'26 The court acknowledged that Adams' discharge may
have been premature, but did not believe that the doctor's failure to
perform tests that would have detected his emergency medical
condition resulted from an improper motive (such as concern about
127
Adams' lack of insurance).
The Supreme Court decided Roberts on the narrow issue of
whether EMTALA's stabilization requirement should be interpreted
to include an improper motive test and properly declined to rule on
128
the two alternative grounds for relief cited in Humana's brief.
Humana's first alternative argument was that it was not liable
120. Id. at 432.
121. 962 F. Supp. 101 (E.D. Mich. 1997).
122. Adams, 962 F. Supp. at 103. In addition to relying on C/eland, this case cited the
Sixth Circuit's decision in Roberts before it was overturned by the United States Supreme
Court. Id. The plaintiff, Romaine Evans, was living with Adams at the time of his death and
sued as personal representative of his estate. Id. Adams arrived at the hospital experiencing
abdominal pain but was discharged after a doctor determined his condition had improved.
Id.
123. Id. at 101.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Adams, 962 F. Supp. at 103. The plaintiff did not assert that an improper motive at
the hearing for summary judgment, but rather presented evidence that Adams was
discharged prematurely and argued that EMTALs appropriate medical screening
requirement should be given its plain meaning. Id. The court concluded that because the
plaintiff "has not even suggested an improper motive, much less presented any evidence in
support of an improper motive... summary judgment must be granted." Id.
128. Brief of Respondent at 17, Roberts v. Galen of Va.Inc., 119 S. Ct. 685 (1999) (No.
97-53).
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under EMTALA because the physicians were unaware of Johnson's
emergency medical condition. 29 In addition to establishing the
motive test, Cleland can be read to relieve a hospital of liability for
failure to stabilize a medical condition of which it was unaware,130
as can a number of cases from other circuit courts.' 3' These cases,
however, deal with patients whose conditions were not discovered
during the initial screening, unlike Johnson who arrived at the
hospital with readily apparent massive injuries, a known emergency
medical condition that the hospital had detected and was
treating. 132 The Supreme Court properly remanded this case for the
lower court to resolve the issue because the truth about the
hospital's awareness of Johnson's condition at the time of her
discharge was a matter of contention between the parties. '-3
Humana's second alternative argument was that EMTALA duties
cease after the initial screening and stabilization of an emergency
medical condition. 134 This argument has some support from cases in
the Fourth and Tenth Circuits. In Bryan v. Rectors and Visitors of
the University of Virginia,'5 the Fourth Circuit interpreted
EMTALA as requiring a hospital to stabilize the initial emergency
medical condition but not to provide long-term care.'3 6 After a
patient has been stabilized, further care is covered by state
malpractice law rather than EMTALA. 137 The Tenth Circuit in
Collins v. DePaul Hospita1'3 agreed and held that a hospital that
had treated a patient for twenty-six days had met its EMTALA
obligations.' 39 A more typical approach is that followed in
Thornton, which held that although EMTALA does not require
long-term care, hospitals have a duty to provide care until the
patient is stabilized, and not just when the patient is in the
129. Id.
130. Brief of Respondent at 36, Roberts v. Galen of Va. Inc., 119 S. Ct. 685 (1999) (No.
97-53).
131. See Summers v. Baptist Med. Ctr. Arkadelphia, 91 F3d 1132 (8th Cir. 1996) (en
banc); Correa v. Hospital San Francisco, 69 F3d 1184 (1st Cir. 1995); Repp v. Anadarko Mun.
Hosp., 43 F3d 519 (10th Cir. 1994); Power v. Arlington Hosp. Ass'n, 42 F.3d 851 (4th Cir.
1994); and Gatewood v. Washington Healthcare Corp., 933 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
132. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 5, Roberts v. Galen of Va., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 685 (1999)
(No. 97-53).
133. Id. at 9.
134. Brief of Respondent at 18, Roberts v. Galen of Va., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 685 (1999) (No.
97-53).
135. 95 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 1996).
136. Bryan, 95 F.3d at 352.
137. Id.
138. 963 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1992).
139. Collins, 963 F2d at 307-08. The court emphasized the length of the treatment. Id.
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emergency room. 140 This issue was properly left for determination
on remand because it had not been thoroughly litigated or briefed
4
before the lower courts involved in Roberts.11
The Supreme Court reached the proper decision in Roberts v.
Galen of Virginia. Although remarks made by individual
congressmen at the time Congress debated EMTALA do indicate a
concern about the dumping of indigent patients, the language of the
statute offers protection to a much broader population. There is no
basis in the text of EMTALA for denying coverage to patients who
are neither poor nor uninsured. While legislative history is useful in
interpreting ambiguous terms, it should not be used to curtail the
scope of a federal law that clearly and plainly goes beyond the
more limited goals discussed by Congress. EMTALA will still
effectively protect the poor and uninsured even though its coverage
is not limited to individuals in those categories. The fact that
Congress has not amended EMTALA to limit its protections to the
poor or uninsured suggests it really did intend the law to cover
"any individual."
Courts have correctly viewed EMTALA as a new cause of action
not available under state law, rather than a federalization of state
malpractice law. This approach is supported by the nature of our
federal system and the statement made by Congress in the statute
itself, that the act only preempts state law to the extent that the
two directly conflict"' 2 The two issues of precisely what standard
of care is required by EMTALA (one of mere uniformity or one
adopted from local medical malpractice law) and the determination
of when EMTALA coverage ceases remain open questions, but
there should be no fear that EMTALA will co-opt the role of the
states in regulating the provision of medical care.
Roberts was the first case involving EMTALA the Supreme Court
has agreed to hear. With its decision to reject a motive test for
EMTALAs stabilization requirement, the Court has laid to rest a
circuit split. The Court did not rule on the motive test the Sixth
Circuit read into EMTALA's appropriate medical screening
140. Thornton, 895 F2d 1131, 1135 (6th Cir. 1990).
141. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 2, Roberts v. Galen of Va, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 685 (1999)
(No. 97-53). The petitioner characterized both alternative arguments as threshold issues that
would determine whether EMTALA applied in the first place, rather than a standard of proof,
like the motive test, employed after the trial court already determined the law did apply. Id.
142. EMTALA states that "the provisions of this section do not preempt any State or
local law requirement, except to the extent that the requirement directly conflicts with a
requirement of this section." 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(f) (1994).
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requirement in Cleland. However, the Court did note that five
circuits have rejected that approach, an indication that it may
likewise reject an improper motive test for EMTALA's appropriate
medical screening requirement. Some circuits have not yet
considered the issue of whether either provision of EMTALA
contains a motive test. By overruling the Sixth Circuit's decision in
Roberts, the Court has eliminated the option of finding a motive
test in the stabilization requirement, and made it much less likely
that any district or circuit court will follow the Sixth Circuit's
precedent in Cleland in finding an improper motive test in
EMTALAs appropriate medical screening requirement. This decision
has strengthened the role of EMTALA in ensuring emergency
medical treatment to all individuals by pushing aside a barrier to
recovery under EMTALA that had no basis in the text of the
statute.
David E. Mitchell

